My Afterthought on Nic Cheeseman’s article “How can we design democracy so that it better fits African realities?”
by Brenda Ngum
Nic Cheeseman’s article “How can we design democracy so that it better fits African realities?” asks urgent questions: What kinds of democratic systems make sense for Africa—not just in theory, but in practice? What trade-offs are unavoidable, and how might constitutions or political institutions be adapted so they are both stable and responsive, avoiding the pitfalls of authoritarian backsliding or ethnic/identity-based conflict? Cheeseman reminds us that Africa is not simply defined by its democratic deficits, but also by many experiments, successes, failures, and potential lessons for the rest of the world.
In the article, Cheeseman offers several arguments; among them, three of his contributions felt important to me the most.
Three Most Important Ideas from the Article
Democracy in Africa has made real progress despite lacking "textbook preconditions."
Cheeseman challenges the often-invoked list of factors that are supposed to guarantee democratic consolidation such as a high per capita GDP, a coherent national identity, strong autonomous institutions, well-developed civil society, and rule of law. He shows that many African states have made substantial progress toward multiparty democracy even though they don’t satisfy many of these “preconditions.” The implication is that we shouldn’t undervalue what has been achieved, and we should not assume that failure is inevitable simply because certain “ideal” conditions are not present.The danger of "winner-takes-all" politics and concentration of power around the presidency.
One of the central problems Cheeseman identifies is that in many African democracies, political systems are heavily skewed toward winners of elections, especially presidents having enormous control over state resources, inclusion, and exclusion. This pattern tends to incentivize exclusionary practices, manipulation of identity politics, corruption, or ethnic violence. Elections themselves, in these settings, sometimes exacerbate conflict instead of resolving it. Cheeseman argues that part of the design problem is the lack of enough checks and balances, or meaningful inclusion for losing parties or marginalized communities.The need for political institutions that balance inclusion and competition.
Cheeseman doesn’t prescribe a single blueprint; rather, he stresses that each country must seek the right balance between inclusion (so that various communities feel they have a stake, that the system is fair even to losers) and competition (so that the government is held accountable, that leadership can change, etc.). He offers examples like constitutional reform or decentralization (devolution) as useful tools. He also cautions, however, that decentralization is not automatically peaceful or harmonious—if local contestation or rivalries are poorly managed, they can erupt in violence. Thus, designing democracy for African contexts often means paying attention to history, demography, geography, and local political culture—finding institutional designs (including powers of opposition, how resources are shared, how subnational units are governed) that suit the particular country.
My Reflections, Thoughts, and Reactions
Reading Cheeseman’s arguments stirred up both hope and concern in me. Here are what I felt, and some of what I think:
Hopeful Realism. I find encouragement in the idea that democracy in Africa has not been simply failing, even when circumstances have been far from ideal. Cheeseman’s perspective reminds me that progress is often messy and incremental, but that does not make it less valuable. It’s easy to look at governance challenges, corruption, or election violence and despair—but the fact that many countries are managing multiparty elections, civil liberties, and some accountability even with weak institutions is something to appreciate. It gives grounds for optimism: African societies do have resilience, and the paths to better democratic culture are being forged even now.
Anxiety about the fragility of democratic systems. At the same time, Cheeseman’s emphasis on how easily democracy can slide into authoritarianism, or how elections can inflame tensions rather than resolve them, alarms me. The concentration of power around the presidency, winner-takes-all systems, exclusion of minority groups—all these are real dangers. For many people, democracy feels like a promise unfulfilled, or a risk, because when the stakes of inclusion are high and institutions weak, what looks like democratic competition can become zero sum. That worries me because human dignity depends on not just formal rights, but also on feeling safe, included, heard.
Institutional design matters deeply, but is hard. One of Cheeseman’s central messages is that how democracy is designed—constitutional structures, decentralization, checks and balances, inclusion mechanisms—matters a lot. This is something that often gets overlooked: it’s common to talk about “democracy” in abstract (elections, speech, etc.), but less about the specific rules, institutions, incentives that make democracy either stable or fragile. I appreciate that Cheeseman does not prescribe a single remedy for all. Different countries will need different mixes. What one country can afford or manage, another cannot; what works in a relatively homogenous society may not in a highly divided one. So, there’s much wisdom in adapting to context.
My questions & what I'd like to see more of. Having said all this, I also come away with some questions and concerns. For example:
Implementation vs design. Even with a good institutional design, does political culture, leadership integrity, civil society and civic education matter more than we often assume? If people in power choose to ignore the “rules,” or if voters don’t trust institutions, design matters less. Cheeseman touches on that, but I wonder how much the article could explore ways to build those norms and cultures—not just institutions.
Economic foundations and material equity. Since politics do not happen in a vacuum, I wonder how much economic redistribution, basic public services, equality in infrastructure, health, and education affect the success of democratic designs. If large segments of the population are materially marginalized, then inclusion in political rules may only go so far.
Role of external actors. Aid, foreign investment, international development agencies, sometimes foreign political interference can help or harm democracy. The article doesn’t deeply delve into how external pressures shape what is possible in designing democracy in African states. Could strong donor dependency undermine local inclusion or produce distorted incentives?
Personal reaction. As someone who values dignity, human equality, and agency, this article makes me both grateful and impatient. Grateful that there are thinkers engaging seriously with how to make democracy better not just more democratic in name, but more responsive and fair. Impatient because change is often slow, and because too many people suffer under suboptimal democratic systems excluded from participation, excluded from resources, excluded from voice.
Conclusion
Cheeseman’s article contributes an important corrective to simple narratives that African democracy is failing simply because “preconditions” aren’t met. He shifts the conversation toward design: how to build institutions and political rules that balance inclusion with accountability; how to avoid dangers of winner-takes-all power; and how to adapt democracy to history, geography, and identity. These are major contributions, because they suggest pathways forward rather than giving up or prescribing one rigid model.
For me, the piece reinforces the belief that democracy is not a fixed template, but a living, adaptable design project. It needs to be rooted in local realities, history, identity, inequality and built in trust, transparency, and inclusivity. It also reinforces the idea that democracy’s value lies not only in elections but in dignity, fairness, participation, and sharing of power.